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ABSTRACT 
 
By abolishing the Rule Against Perpetuities, twenty-one states have 
validated perpetual trusts.  The prevailing view among scholars is that 
enactment of the generation skipping transfer (GST) tax in 1986 
prompted the movement to abolish the Rule by conferring a salient tax 
advantage on long-term trusts.  However, an alternate view holds that 
demand for perpetual trusts stems from donors’ preference for control 
independent of tax considerations.  Proponents of both views have ad-
duced supporting anecdotal evidence.  Using state-level panel data on 
trust assets prior to the adoption of the GST tax, we examine whether a 
state’s abolition of the Rule gave the state an advantage in the jurisdic-
tional competition for trust funds.  We find that, prior to the GST tax, a 
state’s abolition of the Rule did not increase the state’s trust business.  
By contrast, in a prior study we found that, between the enactment of 
the GST tax and 2003, states that abolished the Rule experienced a sub-
stantial increase in trust business.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
enactment of the GST tax prompted the rise of the perpetual trust.  
These findings bear on the debate over proposals to liberalize the law of 
trust termination and modification and to amend the GST tax.  Our find-
ings also contribute to the literature on the bequest motive. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
By year-end 2005, twenty-one states had validated perpetual trusts 
by abolishing the Rule Against Perpetuities (the Rule or the RAP) as 
applied to interests in trust.1  On one view, these states responded to 
demand by donors for perpetual control independent of tax 
considerations.  If so, the perpetual trust might be reckoned as the 
modern counterpart to the fee tail and strict settlement,2 another effort 
 
 1 See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust 
Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 430-33 tbl.5 (2005) 
(collecting the states’ perpetuities laws).  As in our prior study, we define “abolition” as any 
modification of the Rule that would allow for a perpetual trust of intangible personal property or 
that so lengthened the perpetuities period that it no longer represents a practical constraint on trust 
duration.  Thus, we exclude Washington, which permits 150-year trusts, see WASH. REV. CODE § 
11.98.130 (2004), because 150 years is not significantly longer than is possible through the use of 
a saving clause.  See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra, at 433 n.187.  We have also excluded the 
District of Columbia, which abolished the Rule under our definition in 2001.  See D.C. CODE 
ANN. § 19-904(10) (LexisNexis 2005).  For a parsing of the variety of means by which the states 
have validated perpetual trusts, see Garrett Moritz, Note, Dynasty Trusts and the Rule Against 
Perpetuities, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2588, 2590-95 (2003). 
 2 See, e.g., J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 293-94 (4th ed. 
2002) (discussing the strict settlement); JOSEPH BIANCALA, THE FEE TAIL AND THE COMMON 
RECOVERY IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND (2001) (examining the entail); JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES 
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by one generation to control the disposition of the family patrimony by 
subsequent generations.  On the other hand, as is so often the case in the 
development of estate planning techniques, tax incentives may be the 
root cause of the rise of the perpetual trust.  The 1986 enactment of the 
generation skipping transfer (GST) tax conferred a specific and salient 
tax advantage on long-term trusts, and nearly all of the states that have 
abolished the Rule did so after 1986.  Proponents of both views have 
adduced supporting anecdotal evidence. 
This Article assesses the foregoing competing explanations for the 
rise of the perpetual trust.  Prior to the enactment of the GST tax, three 
states had abolished the RAP (Idaho, South Dakota, and Wisconsin).3  
Hence, because the choice-of-law rule treats the law of the trust’s situs 
as governing,4 if settlors demanded perpetual trusts prior to the GST tax 
then these states should have had a disproportionate share of the 
nation’s aggregate trust business prior to 1986.  Using state-level panel 
data, we compare reported trust asset levels among states.  Our 
approach thus has the advantage of analyzing revealed preferences.  
Inasmuch as donors had the option prior to the GST tax of settling a 
trust in a state that had abolished the Rule, evidence of whether they in 
fact did so is a good proxy for whether they wanted to do so.5 
We find no evidence that, prior to the GST tax, abolishing the Rule 
increased a state’s trust business.  Hence, although there are limitations 
in the pre-1985 data, and only three states abolished the Rule before the 
GST tax, our results strongly imply that there was little demand for 
perpetual trusts before the enactment of the GST tax.  By contrast, in a 
prior empirical study we found that from the enactment of the GST tax 
through 2003, a state’s abolition of the Rule increased its reported trust 
assets by about $6 billion and its average trust account size by roughly 
$200,000.6  That study’s findings imply that, from the time the GST tax 
 
E. KRIER, PROPERTY 215-19 (5th ed. 2002) (discussing both entails and strict settlements); 
Jeffrey Evans Stake, Evolution of Rules in a Common Law System: Differential Litigation of the 
Fee Tail and Other Perpetuities, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 401, 410-19 (2005); see also A.W.B. 
SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 125-38 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing means of breaking 
entails). 
 3 See infra note 32 and accompanying text.  
 4 We examine the relevant choice-of-law considerations in Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra 
note 1, at 374-75.  See also Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule 
Against Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2103-04 (2003).  An 
important related development is the shift from land to easily portable financial assets as the 
primary mode of accumulating wealth.  See John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution 
in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722 (1988); cf. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death 
of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 38 (1996) (observing that “the world recognizes the right of an 
owner of liquid wealth to move it to any nation that offers a better deal”). 
 5 We discuss infra potential problems with using what donors did as a proxy for what donors 
wanted in the text accompanying notes 104-105. 
 6 See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 1, at 410. 
  
2468 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 27:6 
 
took effect through 2003, roughly $100 billion in trust assets moved as a 
result of the Rule’s abolition.7  Accordingly, we conclude that the 1986 
enactment of the GST tax sparked the movement to abolish the Rule 
and the rise of the perpetual trust.8 
We do not deny the possibility that some perpetual trust settlors 
want perpetual control independent of tax considerations.  Moreover, 
because perpetual trust forms are now readily available (reducing the 
transaction costs of settling a perpetual trust) and the widespread use of 
perpetual trusts to achieve tax savings has brought into focus the non-
tax benefits of perpetual trusts,9 we suspect that if the transfer taxes 
were abolished,10 some demand for perpetual trusts might persist.  
However, in such a scenario the continued popularity of perpetual trusts 
would still be due to the salience that the GST tax gave to perpetual 
trusts.11  Virtually all non-tax benefits of a perpetual trust that are 
currently available were also available prior to the GST tax.  Yet we 
find no evidence that abolishing the RAP prior to the GST tax increased 
a state’s trust business. 
In our prior study, we concluded that transferors who desire a 
perpetual trust but live in a state that has retained the Rule have had 
little difficulty in creating perpetual trusts in spite of the additional 
transaction costs of settling a trust out of state.12  To the extent that the 
 
 7 We caution that the $100 billion figure is only a point estimate.  For discussion of this 
estimate and its confidence interval, see id. at 404 & n.125. 
 8 In her commentary on this article, Mary Louise Fellows examines “the components that 
made up the dry tinder on which [the GST tax] spark fell.”  Mary Louise Fellows, Why the 
Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Sparked Perpetual Trusts, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2511, 2511 
(2006). 
 9 See, e.g., RICHARD W. NENNO, DELAWARE DYNASTY TRUSTS, TOTAL RETURN TRUSTS, 
AND ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS 163-73 (2005) (providing a sample generation-skipping-trust 
agreement), id. at 26-27 (discussing reasons apart from the GST tax for a perpetual trust). 
 10 The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) repeals the 
GST tax and the estate tax (but not the gift tax) as to transfers in 2010.  See Pub. L. No. 107-16, 
115 Stat. 38 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).  EGTRRA also 
reduces somewhat the marginal tax rates while increasing the lifetime exemption in the years 
before 2010.  See infra notes 46, 48.  But for transfers occurring in 2011 and beyond, EGTRRA 
reinstates both the GST tax and the estate tax at their 2001 levels.  One imagines that gift 
certificates for sky-diving and tickets for trips to dangerous parts of the world might be popular 
gifts from children to parents in 2010.  On the political economy of EGTRRA and the estate tax 
repeal movement, see MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE 
FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005).  See also David G. Duff, The Abolition of 
Wealth Transfer Taxes: Lessons from Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Univ. of Toronto, 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 05-08, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=719744 (follow “Social Science Research Network” link to download). 
 11 There is a loose analogy to the phenomenon of information cascades and herding.  See, 
e.g., Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J. ECON. 797 (1992); Sushil 
Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural 
Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992); Timur Kuran & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 721 (1999). 
 12 See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 1, at 414.   
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policies that underpin the Rule continue to have contemporary 
relevance, it is therefore necessary to look elsewhere to implement those 
policies.13  Understanding the motivation for the movement to abolish 
the Rule illuminates the pros and cons of alternative means of 
implementing the Rule’s underlying policies. 
For example, because Jesse Dukeminier and James Krier assume 
that the primary rationale for using a perpetual trust is to minimize 
taxes, they have endorsed liberalizing the rules of trust modification and 
termination, and of trustee removal, to allow courts to adapt the terms of 
the trust in light of unanticipated changed circumstances.14  If the 
settlor’s primary purpose was to minimize taxes, allowing modification 
or termination in the event of unanticipated changed circumstances 
probably advances the settlor’s intent.  The 2000 Uniform Trust Code, 
already adopted by fourteen states and the District of Columbia, 
liberalizes the common law of trust modification and termination based 
on similar reasoning.15  By contrast, Joshua Tate believes that settlors 
create perpetual trusts to ensure perpetual control irrespective of tax 
considerations.  Tate therefore cautions that liberalizing modification 
and termination rules would in many cases frustrate, not advance, the 
settlor’s intent.16 
Empirical analysis of the rise of the perpetual trust also speaks to 
the current policy debate over reforming the federal wealth transfer 
taxes.  The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) as well as 
various commentators have proposed amending the tax code to strip 
perpetual trusts of their tax advantage.17  Our conclusion that the typical 
 
 13 See Ira Mark Bloom, The GST Tax Tail Is Killing the Rule Against Perpetuities, 87 TAX 
NOTES 569, 570-71 (2000); Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 
50 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1317-39 (2003); Eric Rakowski, The Future Reach of the Disembodied 
Will, 4 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 91 (2005); Sterk, supra note 4, at 2108-17; Angela M. Vallario, 
Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Rule Against Perpetuities, 25 J. LEGIS. 141, 154-62 (1999); 
Moritz, supra note 1, at 2595-2608. 
 14 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 13, at 1339-42; see also Susan F. French, Perpetual 
Trusts, Conservation Servitudes, and the Problem of the Future, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2523, 
2530-31, 2534-35 (2006). 
 15 See David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy 
Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 169-77 (2002); see also Ronald Chester, Modification and 
Termination of Trusts in the 21st Century: The Uniform Trust Code Leads a Quiet Revolution, 35 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 697, 720 (2001); Alan Newman, The Intention of the Settlor Under 
the Uniform Trust Code: Whose Property Is It, Anyway?, 38 AKRON L. REV. 649, 654-69 (2005); 
Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 658-63 
(2004).  Perhaps a useful analogy is to the doctrine of cy pres in charitable trusts, which are 
privileged with an exemption from the Rule.  See JESSE DUKEMINIER, STANLEY M. JOHANSON, 
JAMES LINDGREN & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 737-42 (7th ed. 2005). 
 16 See Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and the Settlor’s Intent, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 595, 620-
25 (2005). 
 17 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX 
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 392-95 (Comm. Print 2005) [hereinafter JCT 
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donor uses a perpetual trust primarily because of its tax advantage lends 
support to such proposals.  Avoidance behavior suggests a deadweight 
loss. 
Our empirical understanding of the reasons for the rise of the 
perpetual trust also contributes to the literature on the bequest motive.  
Scholars have long debated the relative importance of various motives 
for making donative transfers, both during life and at death, including 
altruism, tax planning, precautionary savings, the ability to extract 
services from one’s kin, and dynastic impulses.18  Although the rise of 
the perpetual trust might be viewed as evidence of a dynastic impulse, 
our findings suggest instead that the modern perpetual trust is primarily 
a creature of the federal transfer taxes. 
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows.  Part I 
reviews the Rule Against Perpetuities, including its purposes, its reform 
in the latter part of the twentieth century, and its recent demise.  Part II 
surveys the anecdotal evidence and prior literature on what sparked the 
movement to abolish the Rule and casts a comparative glance abroad to 
Scotland.  Part III presents our empirical analysis, which includes a 
description of our data, an explanation of our identification strategies, 
and both graphical and regression analyses.  Part III also presents a non-
technical summary of our main empirical findings.  The Article ends 
with a short discussion of conclusions and implications. 
 
I.     THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES19 
A.     The Rule and Its Policies 
 
The Rule Against Perpetuities prohibits remote vesting of property 
interests.  The classic formulation is that of John Chipman Gray: “No 
 
Report], available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf; see also infra note 43 and 
accompanying text. 
 18 See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim et al., The Strategic Bequest Motive, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1045 
(1985); Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547, 548-49 (1964); Franco 
Modigliani, The Role of Intergenerational Transfers and Life Cycle Saving in the Accumulation 
of Wealth, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1988, at 15; Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the 
Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 567; Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous 
Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411 (1977); James Poterba, Estate and Gift 
Taxes and Incentives for Inter Vivos Giving in the U.S., 79 J. PUB. ECON. 237 (2001); Steven 
Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Altruism and Deferred Gifts, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (1991).  
There is also a growing literature that draws on behavioral economics and sociobiology to 
examine this question.  See, e.g., Donald Cox, Private Transfers Within the Family: Mothers, 
Fathers, Sons and Daughters, in DEATH AND DOLLARS: THE ROLE OF GIFTS AND BEQUESTS IN 
AMERICA 168 (Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Sundén eds., 2003); Lee Anne Fennell, Death, 
Taxes, and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REV. 567 (2003). 
 19 This section draws on Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 1, at 364-78. 
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interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one 
years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.”20  The 
period of the Rule reflects a common law policy that a transferor should 
be allowed to tie up property only for so long as the life of anyone 
possibly known to the transferor plus the period of the next generation’s 
minority (hence lives in being plus twenty-one years).21 
The Rule is said to have two purposes: (1) to keep property 
marketable, and (2) to limit “dead-hand” control.  Preventing indefinite 
fracturing of property ownership implements the first purpose.  The idea is 
that ownership of land periodically will be reconstituted into fee simple 
because all contingent future interests in the property must vest or fail 
within the perpetuities period. 
The dead-hand rationale for the Rule is best understood as a response 
to the disagreeable consequences that can arise from unanticipated 
circumstances.22  The Rule implements this anti-dead hand policy by 
curbing future interests that, after some period of time and change in 
circumstances, tie up the property in potentially disadvantageous 
arrangements.  As Brian Simpson explains, “given that one can, to a 
limited extent only, foresee the future and the problems it will generate, 
landowners should not be allowed to tie up lands for periods outside the 
range of reasonable foresight.”23  Forever is a long time. 
 
 20 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (4th ed. 1942). 
 21 See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.16, at 51 (A. James Casner ed., 1952) (noting that 
the Rule permits “a man of property . . . [to] provide for all of those in his family whom he personally 
knew and the first generation after them upon attaining majority”).  As Hobhouse put it: 
A clear, obvious, natural line is drawn for us between those persons and events which 
the Settlor knows and sees, and those which he cannot know and see.  Within the 
former province we may trust his natural affections and his capacity of judgment to 
make better dispositions than any external Law is likely to make for him.  Within the 
latter, natural affection does not extend, and the wisest judgment is constantly baffled 
by the course of events. 
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND 188 (188); see also id. at 183-85 (1880). 
 22 Compare T.P. Gallanis, The Rule Against Perpetuities and the Law Commission’s Flawed 
Philosophy, 59 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 284 (2000) (urging that the dead hand argument be conceived in 
terms of the economic consequences of perpetuities), with ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, THE 
RULES AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND EXCESSIVE ACCUMULATIONS, Report No. 25, 1997-8, H.L. 251, 
at 5, 8, 20 (1998), available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc251.pdf (putting the dead hand 
argument in terms of intergenerational fairness), and LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE 
DEAD HAND 58-59 (1955) (same). 
 23 A.W.B. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY 159-60 (1987).  Simpson 
continues:  
The good patriarch looks into the future, but not too long. . . .  The compromise which 
English law adopted was to allow property to be tied up for the lifetime of someone in 
existence at the time of the settlement and a reasonable period thereafter—for example, 
a minority . . . .   
Id. at 160.  But see Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision of Private Goods, 37 
EMORY L.J. 295, 307 (1988) (arguing that settlors “will take the possibility of unforeseen 
contingencies into account when creating the trust”). 
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Measured against its purposes, the Rule is both underinclusive and 
overinclusive.  The Rule is underinclusive because it only applies to 
contingent interests, but vested interests that will not become possessory 
for a long period of time can also compromise the Rule’s underlying 
policy objectives.24  It is overinclusive because if the trustee is given the 
power to sell the trust property and reinvest the proceeds, as is typical,25 
there is no concern with marketability.26  Nonetheless, the prevailing 
academic view is that the Rule “does, by and large, effectively prevent 
tying up property for an inordinate length of time.”27 
 
B.     Twentieth Century Reform 
 
Under the what-might-happen possibilities test of the orthodox Rule, 
even the most implausible assumption about what might happen will 
render a contingent future interest invalid.  Hence the casebooks are 
replete with improbable and bizarre occurrences such as childbearing 
octogenarians and toddlers, unborn widows, inexhaustible gravel pits, 
wars that never end, slothful executors, and explosive birthday presents.28  
Eventually, dissatisfaction with the Rule’s exasperating complexities, 
absurd assumptions, and booby traps led to reform to stay what Barton 
Leach famously called “the slaughter of the innocents” in the Rule’s 
“reign of terror.”29 
 
 24 See T.P. Gallanis, The Future of Future Interests, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 513, 559-60 
(2003). 
25 The modern trustee’s default powers are broad.  See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 815 (amended 
2003), § 816 (2000), 7C U.L.A. 310, 310, 311-16 (Supp. 2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 85 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 15, at 777-78; John 
H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 640-43 (1995). 
 26 See SIMES, supra note 22, at 40-42.  Today, because almost all life estates and future 
interests are created in trust rather than as legal interests, the Rule’s primary contemporary 
application is to interests in trusts funded with stocks, bonds, and other liquid financial assets. 
 27 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 15, at 675. 
 28 See ELIAS CLARK, LOUIS LUSKY & ARTHUR W. MURPHY, GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS 753-
69 (1977); JOEL C. DOBRIS, STEWART E. STERK & MELANIE B. LESLIE, ESTATES AND TRUSTS 
839-48 (2d ed. 2003); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 15, at 678-86; DUKEMINIER & KRIER, 
supra note 2, at 306-11; WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS 
AND ESTATES 457 (3d ed. 2004); EUGENE F. SCOLES, EDWARD C. HALBACH, JR., RONALD C. 
LINK & PATRICIA GILCHRIST ROBERTS, DECEDENT’S ESTATES AND TRUSTS 1075-78 (6th ed. 
2000); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES 608-09 (3d 
ed. 2002); VALERIE J. VOLLMAR, AMY MORRIS HESS & ROBERT WHITMAN, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO TRUSTS AND ESTATES 982-85 (2003); LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, 
MARY LOUISE FELLOWS & THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 1206-18 (3d ed. 
2002). 
 29 W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule’s Reign of Terror, 65 
HARV. L. REV. 721 (1952) [hereinafter Leach, Terror]; W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities: Staying 
the Slaughter of the Innocents, 68 L.Q. REV. 35 (1952). 
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Some states enacted statutory fixes for specific fantasy scenarios, 
in particular the unborn widow and the fertile octogenarian.  Other 
states authorized the courts to reform instruments that otherwise would 
have been void ab initio.  Still other states adopted the so-called wait-
and-see principle whereby courts wait to see if, in light of actual instead 
of possible events, the interest will in fact vest or fail within a specified 
period. 
The culmination of the twentieth-century perpetuities reform 
movement was the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities 
(USRAP) of 1986.  USRAP, some form of which is now in force in 
about half the states, provides a wait-and-see period of ninety years and 
authorizes reformation of instruments that would otherwise violate the 
Rule.30  A related response to the Rule’s dangers was the development 
of the perpetuities saving clause.  Such a clause ensures that an 
overlooked violation of the Rule will not render the trust invalid.  The 
use of a saving clause is standard good drafting practice.31 
The unifying theme of the perpetuities reform movement through 
1995—except, of course, in Idaho, South Dakota, and Wisconsin, which 
for reasons that are not entirely clear abolished their Rules by 1957, 1983, 
and 1969 respectively32—was continuing respect for the long-standing 
policy against remote vesting.  Even in its reformed versions and buffered 
by saving clauses, the Rule required contingent interests to vest or fail 
within a specified period.  For this reason, for most of the twentieth 
century the Rule limited the duration of trusts.33 
 
 30 Both wait-and-see in general and USRAP in particular sparked such heated debate in the 
law reviews that Susan French aptly dubbed the academic conflicts as the “Perpetuities Wars.”  
Susan F. French, Perpetuities: Three Essays in Honor of My Father, 65 WASH. L. REV. 323, 332-
34 (1990); see also Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 1, at 366-69 (recounting the perpetuities 
wars and collecting citations); infra note 53.  In her commentary on this article, Mary Louise 
Fellows suggests that USRAP was “part of the dry tinder on which the GST tax fell to spark perpetual 
trusts.  Simplification and codification of the RAP made repeal widely and easily imaginable.”  
Fellows, supra note 8, at 2511. 
 31 See DAVID M. BECKER, PERPETUITIES AND ESTATE PLANNING 133-84 (1993); 
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 15, at 695-96; WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 28, at 1218-27.  
Hence, contrary to a pernicious leading case, see Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961), it is 
almost certainly malpractice to draft an instrument that violates the Rule and lacks a saving 
clause.  See Wright v. Williams, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 n.2 (Ct. App. 1975); JOSEPH WILLIAM 
SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY § 7.7.4, at 333 (2d ed. 2005). 
 32 Wisconsin may have abolished its Rule even earlier (indeed, Wisconsin may never have 
had the Rule).  See Friedman, supra note 18, at 550; W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities: The Nutshell 
Revisited, 78 HARV. L. REV. 973, 974-75 (1965).  We need not resolve the status of the Rule in 
Wisconsin prior to 1969, however, because our data does not begin until that year. 
 33 Because the rule prohibits vesting outside of the applicable perpetuities period, the identity 
of all persons with a claim to the underlying trust property will be ascertained within that period.  
Once all the beneficiaries are ascertained, they can terminate the trust when the perpetuities 
period ends.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.1 (1983); 
1A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 62.10 (William Franklin Fratcher 4th ed. 
1987); see also CLARK ET AL., supra note 28, at 769.  If the beneficiaries do not terminate the 
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C.     Toward the Twenty-First Century: Repeal 
 
Unlike prior reform efforts, which preserved the Rule’s core 
prohibition against remote vesting, beginning in the mid-1990s a 
movement arose to repeal the Rule as applied to interests in trust.  This 
movement appears to have originated in Delaware, which abolished its 
Rule in 1995.34  The official synopsis of the Delaware legislation states 
its purpose plainly: 
Several states, including Idaho, Wisconsin and South Dakota, have 
abolished altogether their rules against perpetuities, which has given 
those jurisdictions a competitive advantage over Delaware in 
attracting assets held in trusts created for estate planning 
purposes. . . . 
   The multi-million dollar capital commitments to these 
irrevocable trusts, and the ensuing compound growth over decades, 
will result in the formation of a substantial capital base in the 
innovative jurisdictions that have abolished the rule against 
perpetuities.  Several financial institutions have now organized or 
acquired trust companies, particularly in South Dakota, at least in 
part to take advantage of their favorable trust law. 
   Delaware’s repeal of the rule against perpetuities for personal 
property held in trust will demonstrate Delaware’s continued 
vigilance in maintaining its role as a leading jurisdiction for the 
formation of capital and the conduct of trust business.35 
In response, Alaska, Arizona, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, New 
Jersey, Ohio, and Rhode Island authorized perpetual trusts by year-end 
2000.36  By year-end 2005, Colorado, Florida (360 years), Missouri, 
Nebraska, Nevada (360 years), New Hampshire, Utah (1,000 years), 
Virginia, and Wyoming (1,000 years) had followed suit.37  The 
legislative history and contemporaneous local media coverage of these 
repeals indicate that their purpose was to preserve competitiveness in 
the jurisdictional competition for so-called dynasty trust funds,38 
 
trust, the trust corpus will be distributed to the principal beneficiaries when the preceding life 
estates expire. 
 34 See Act of July 7, 1995, 70 Del. Laws 428 (1995). 
 35 H.R. 245, 138th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 1995) (bill synopsis). 
 36 See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 1, at 430-33 tbl.5. 
 37 Id. (listing states, dates of trust law changes, and lengths of perpetuities periods). 
 38 See, e.g., Assemb. 2804, 208th Leg., 2d Ann. Sess. (N.J. 1999) (stating that the purpose of 
repeal was “to permit banks and trust companies to offer ‘dynasty trusts’ to their customers, such 
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meaning perpetual transfer-tax-exempt trusts.39  In a related vein, the 
governor of South Dakota—one of the three states that had abolished 
the Rule prior to Delaware—created a task force in 1997 to study the 
South Dakota trust laws and to recommend reforms “to allow South 
Dakota to continue its position as a highly desirable jurisdiction in 
which to locate trusts.”40 
Figure 1 illustrates the extent of the Rule’s abolition at year-end 
2005. 
 
as those that are being offered by banks and trust companies located in other states”); Fact Sheet 
for S.B. 1112, 43d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1998), available at 
http://www.azleg.state.az.us/legtext/43leg/2r/summary/s.1112.ced.htm (stating that Arizona’s 
perpetual trust legislation was “an effort to retain people who want to set up [perpetual trusts] in 
state”); Trusts and Property Transfers in Trust: Hearings on H.B. 101 Before the Subcomm. on 
Labor and Commerce, 20th Leg. (Alaska 1997) (statement of Rep. Vezey), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/Folhome.htm (search 20th Legislature Committee Minutes); 
Katharine Fraser, With New Law, Alaska Aiming to Be Trust Capital, AM. BANKER, Apr. 21, 
1997, at 1; Carrie Lehman, Legislation Changes Alaska Tax, Trust Laws, Attracts New Investors 
to State, ALASKA J. COMM., Aug. 18, 1997, at 1; Deanna Thomas, Trust Bill Could Mean Boon, 
ALASKA STAR, Mar. 20, 1997, at 1, available at http://www.hompesch.com/pr04.htm; Rachel 
Wolcott, New Jersey Poised to Allow Dynasty Trusts, PRIVATE ASSET MGMT., May 17, 1999, at 
1 (stating that the New Jersey legislation, which was “sponsored by the New Jersey Bankers 
Association, was drawn up so that New Jersey trust institutions could avoid losing potential 
dynasty trust business and other types of trust business to Delaware, South Dakota and Alaska”). 
 39 See infra Part II.A. 
 40 See Michael J. Myers & Rollyn H. Samp, South Dakota Trust Amendments and Economic 
Development: The Tort of “Negligent Trust Situs” at its Incipient Stage?, 44 S.D. L. REV. 662, 
664 (1999) (discussing the South Dakota task force). 
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Not surprisingly, legislation designed to abolish the Rule is under 
consideration in several more states.41 
II.     CURRENT UNDERSTANDINGS 
A.     The Dominant View: The GST Tax 
 
The dominant view among both scholars and policymakers is that 
the enactment of the generation skipping transfer tax in 198642 sparked 
the movement to abolish the Rule.43  Mass media outlets such as the 
 
 41 See Tate, supra note 16, at 604 n.45 (collecting legislation pending as of 2005). 
 42 The GST tax provisions comprise Chapter 13 of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. §§ 
2601-2663 (2000).  The Tax Reform Act of 1976 contained a GST tax, but the 1976 scheme was 
later repealed retroactively.  See JEFFREY N. PENNELL, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION 
981-88 (4th ed. 2003); STEPHANIE J. WILLBANKS, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION: AN 
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE § 15.01, at 220 (3d ed. 2004). 
 43 See, e.g., JCT Report, supra note 17, at 393; Dennis L. Belcher & Mary Louise Fellows, 
Report on Reform of Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes Task Force on Federal Wealth Transfer 
Taxes, 58 TAX LAW. 93, 269 (2004); Bloom, supra note 13, at 569; Joel C. Dobris, Changes in 
the Role and the Form of the Trust at the New Millennium, or, We Don’t Have to Think of 
England Anymore, 62 ALB. L. REV. 543, 572 n.135 (1998); Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 13, 
at 1312 (Dukeminier & Krier’s view) & 1317 n.59 (reporting John Langbein’s view); French, 
supra note 14, at 2524-25; Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 
1163, 1180 n.90 (1999); Sterk, supra note 4, at 2100; Vallario, supra note 13, at 156-58; see also 
BORIS I. BITTKER, ELIAS CLARK & GRAYSON M.P. MCCOUCH, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT 
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Figure 1: Perpetual Trust States (2005)
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Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and Forbes magazine tell a 
similar story.44 
Prior to 1986, the estate tax could be avoided via successive life 
interests, for example, by leaving property to one’s child for life, then to 
one’s grandchild.45  Because a life tenancy terminates at death and the 
estate tax is levied only on the decedent’s transferable interests, in the 
foregoing example there would be no tax when, on the death of the 
transferor’s child, the transferor’s grandchild’s interest became 
possessory.  The 1986 GST tax closed the successive-life-estates 
loophole by levying a tax equal to the highest rate of the estate tax on 
any generation-skipping transfer.46  In rough terms, a transfer to a 
grandchild, great-grandchild, or any other person who is two or more 
generations below the transferor is a generation-skipping transfer.47 
However, under the 1986 code (as amended through 2006) a 
transferor can pass $1 million during life, or $2 million at death, free 
from federal wealth transfer taxes, including the GST tax.48  By funding 
a trust with the amount of the transferor’s exemption, successive 
generations can benefit from the trust fund and any appreciation therein, 
 
TAXATION 573 (9th ed. 2005); REGIS W. CAMPFIELD, MARTIN B. DICKINSON & WILLIAM J. 
TURNIER, TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 730 (22d ed. 2002); DOBRIS ET AL., supra 
note 28, at 900-02; DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 15, at 558; DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 
2, at 335-38; WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 28, at 1251-53; LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER & 
THOMAS P. GALLANIS, ESTATES AND FUTURE INTERESTS IN A NUTSHELL § 5.16 (2005); cf. 
Macey, supra note 23, at 308. 
  From time to time scholars have noted that litigated perpetuities cases typically involve not 
failed dynastic efforts but technical violations of the Rule that, with better drafting, could have 
been avoided without compromising the transferor’s objectives.  See, e.g., Leach, Terror, supra 
note 29, at 723.  However, because the instruments at issue in such cases were drafted in the 
shadow of the Rule (albeit by a lawyer who did not catch the technical violation), they shed little 
light on the empirical question whether transferors have a taste for perpetual control.  Cf. George 
L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 
(1984). 
 44 See, e.g., Carole Gould, Shifting Rules Add Luster to Trusts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2000, § 
3, at 11; Rachel Emma Silverman, Building Your Own Dynasty; States Toss Out Restrictions on 
Creating Perpetual Trusts; Downside—Fees Last Forever, Too, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2004, at 
D1; John Turrettini, Providing for the Year 3000, FORBES, June 11, 2001, at 220; see also Bruce 
W. Fraser, The Rush to Dynasty Trusts, FIN. ADVISOR, June 2005, at 111 (summarizing the 
findings of our prior study); Rachel Emma Silverman, Looser Trust Laws Lure $100 Billion, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2005, at D1 (same). 
 45 See CAMPFIELD ET AL., supra note 43, at 722-24; DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 15, at 
919; PENNELL, supra note 42, at 981-83. 
 46 The maximum rates are as follows: 49% in 2003; 48% in 2004; 47% in 2005; 46% in 2006; 
and 45% in 2007-09.  I.R.C. §§ 2641, 2001. 
 47 See id. § 2651 (defining generational assignments); id. § 2613 (defining skip and non-skip 
persons); id. § 2611 (defining generation-skipping transfer); id. § 2612 (defining taxable events); 
see also PAUL R. MCDANIEL, JAMES R. REPETTI & PAUL L. CARON, FEDERAL WEALTH 
TRANSFER TAXATION 713-16 (5th ed. 2003). 
 48 Federal wealth transfer taxes comprise estate, gift, and GST taxes.  The exemption 
schedule is as follows: through 2003, $1,000,000; in 2004 and 2005, $1,500,000; in 2006 through 
2008, $2,000,000; and in 2009, $3,500,000.  I.R.C. §§ 2631(c), 2010(c). 
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free from federal wealth transfer taxes, for as long as state perpetuities 
law will allow the trust to endure.  Thus, as the prominent Boston estate 
planning lawyer, Raymond Young, foresaw in testimony to Congress 
prior to the enactment of the 1986 GST tax, the transfer-tax exemption 
would invite increased use of generation-skipping trusts.49   
Crucially, Congress put no limit on the duration of a transfer-tax-
exempt trust, leaving that question to state perpetuities law.50  
Enactment of the GST tax therefore gave state perpetuities law renewed 
salience among estate planners.  The longer a transfer-tax-exempt trust 
could be extended, the more generations could benefit from the trust 
fund free from transfer taxes.  In a state that has abolished the Rule, 
successive generations can benefit from the trust fund, free from 
subsequent federal wealth transfer taxation, forever.  On this view, the 
movement to abolish the Rule is perhaps more precisely described as a 
race between the states to allow donors to exploit a loophole in the 
federal transfer taxes.51 
Considerable evidence supports the view that the GST tax sparked 
demand for perpetual trusts by giving trust duration greater salience in 
estate planning.  Not long after the enactment of the GST tax, trust 
companies in South Dakota began advertising for out-of-state trust 
business in the practitioner journals by touting South Dakota as a place 
where a “generation skipping trust” was “possible” because “there is no 
 
 49 Young testified: 
However, we are obliged to point out to you that if [the 1986 GST tax] is adopted . . . , 
it will be an inducement to generation-skipping.  You will have more generation-
skipping than you ever had under pre-1976 law, and there will be a greater erosion of 
the tax base, because you will have the banks, lawyers, financial planners, and all 
others saying, here you are, this is a specially created opportunity for you.  Congress 
has said you can take $1 million, put it aside, no generation-skipping tax. 
Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th 
Cong. 335, 336 (1984) (testimony of Raymond Young).  Young then observed that such a trust 
could “last within the period of the rule against perpetuities.”  Id. 
 50 “When Congress originally enacted a tax on generation-skipping transfers, it noted that 
‘[m]ost States have a rule against perpetuities which limits the duration of a trust.’”  JCT Report, 
supra note 17, at 394. 
 51 For the sake of expositional simplicity, we employ the common metaphor for jurisdictional 
competition of a race between the states.  In our prior study, however, we embraced an interest-
group model, extending the Macey and Miller lawyer-focused model to include transactional 
lawyers in addition to litigators.  See Jonathan Macey, Delaware: Home of the World’s Most 
Expensive Raincoat, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1131, 1136-39 (2005); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey 
P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 
(1987); Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 1, at 416-18; see also Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as 
Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69 MO. L. REV. 299, 299 (2004) (arguing that lawyer 
licensing “encourages lawyers to participate in lawmaking by capitalizing the benefits of their 
law-improvement efforts in the value of the law license”).  The primary interest groups that 
agitate for state trust law reform are local bankers and lawyers.  See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, 
supra note 1, at 417; Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 
85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1060 & n.126 (2000). 
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rule against perpetuities.”52  By contrast, prior to the 1986 tax change, 
there was little discussion in the practitioner literature of the theoretical 
advantages to, or the use in practice of, perpetual trusts.53  Not until the 
1990s (after Delaware’s abolition of the RAP) did lawyers begin 
publishing articles and continuing legal education materials analyzing 
the tax and other advantages of creating a perpetual trust.54 
The Delaware legislature did not validate perpetual trusts until 
1995.  The hegemon of corporate regulatory competition, Delaware has 
also long been a trust-friendly jurisdiction.  In 1986 Delaware had a 
disproportionate share of the nation’s trust funds,55 and on several 
occasions prior to 1986 Delaware tweaked—but did not abolish—its 
 
 52 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 15, at 714 (reproducing a Wells Fargo ad); see also 
Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 13, at 1315 (discussing marketing of perpetual trusts). 
 53 Although there was little discussion of perpetual trusts, the drafting and promulgation of 
USRAP prompted a large academic literature on perpetuities policy.  See, e.g., Ira Mark Bloom, 
Perpetuities Refinement: There Is an Alternative, 62 WASH. L. REV. 23 (1987); Jesse Dukeminier, 
Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1648 (1985) (launching the opening salvo 
in a four-piece, one hundred-page exchange with Waggoner in a single issue of the Columbia 
Law Review); Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years 
in Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1023 (1987) [hereinafter Dukeminier, Limbo]; Jesse Dukeminier, 
Wait-and-See: The Causal Relationship Principle, 102 L.Q. REV. 250 (1986); Mary Louise 
Fellows, Testing Perpetuity Reforms: A Study of Perpetuity Cases 1984-89, 25 REAL PROP. PROB. & 
TR. J. 597 (1991); Amy Morris Hess, Freeing Property Owners from the RAP Trap: Tennessee 
Adopts the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 62 TENN. L. REV. 267 (1995); Ronald C. 
Link & Kimberly A. Licata, Perpetuities Reform in North Carolina: The Uniform Statutory Rule 
Against Perpetuities, Nondonative Transfers, and Honorary Trusts, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1783 (1996); 
Lawrence W. Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1718 (1983); Lawrence W. 
Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The Rationale of the 90-Year 
Waiting Period, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 157 (1988); see also Paul G. Haskell, A Proposal for a 
Simple and Socially Effective Rule Against Perpetuities, 66 N.C. L. REV. 545, 562 (1988) 
(proposing a rule of trust duration of 125 years).  
 54 See, e.g., Douglas J. Blattmachr & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, A New Direction in Estate 
Planning: North to Alaska, TR. & EST., Sept. 1997, at 48; Douglas J. Blattmachr & Richard W. 
Hompesch, II, Alaska vs. Delaware: Heavyweight Competition in New Trust Laws, 12 PROB. & 
PROP. 32 (1998); Thomas H. Foye, Using South Dakota Law for Perpetual Trusts, 12 PROB. & 
PROP. 17 (1998); Al W. King, A Generation-Skipping Trust: Unlimited Duration? Why Not?, TR. 
& EST., June 1999, at 8; Pierce H. McDowell, III, The Dynasty Trust: Protective Armor for 
Generations to Come, TR. & EST., Oct. 1993, at 47; Richard W. Nenno, Planning with Perpetual 
Dynasty Trusts (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Apr. 18-22, 2005), WL SK069 ALI-ABA 121; 
Daniel G. Worthington, The Problems and Promise of Perpetual Trust Laws, TR. & EST., Dec. 
2004, at 15; Andrew J. Willms & Dean T. Stange, Wisconsin: An Estate Planning Paradise, 
72WIS. LAW., Feb. 1999, at 20; see also John A. Warnick & Sergio Pareja, Selecting a Trust Situs 
in the 21st Century, 16 PROB. & PROP. 53 (2002) (discussing perpetuities repeal and the GST tax 
as crucial considerations in choosing a trust situs). 
 55 In 1986 Delaware’s share of all trust funds held by federally-reporting trustees was eight 
times larger than its share of the population (2% versus 0.25%).  In 1986, when New York 
institutional trustees held $3,500 in trust assets per state resident, Delaware institutional trustees 
held $12,600 in trust assets per state resident.  For a visual representation of Delaware’s dominant 
position, see Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 1, at 393 fig.4, 398 fig.8.  Delaware’s success 
in the jurisdictional competition for trust funds prior to 1986 is confirmed by the regression 
analysis presented below.  See infra Part III.D.1. 
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perpetuities law to create tax and other advantages to settling a trust in 
Delaware.56  Hence, that Delaware did not abolish the Rule as applied to 
interests in trust until 1995,57 but that in the ten years since 1995 
seventeen other states have done so, supports the view that there was 
little demand for perpetual trusts prior to the GST tax. 
Practitioners interviewed by Jesse Dukeminier and James Krier 
reported that South Dakota “enjoyed a substantial increase in trust 
business since 1986”; that since Alaska’s repeal of the RAP Alaska has 
gotten at least seven hundred new perpetual trusts; and that “‘South 
Dakota and Delaware institutions probably have more.’”58  In a similar 
vein, lawyers and bankers in New York and other states that have 
retained the Rule only began agitating for its repeal after the 1986 tax 
reform, once they began to perceive a loss of business to other states.59 
Finally, in our prior empirical perpetuities study we examined the 
effect of repealing the RAP on a state’s trust business using state-level 
panel data spanning 1985 through 2003.  In 1985 and 1986, the two 
years prior to the GST tax that were included in our sample, average 
account sizes in Wisconsin, Idaho, and South Dakota closely matched 
those of their neighboring states and substantially trailed the national 
average.  After the GST tax, however, average account size in 
abolishing states increased on average by $200,000.  Thus, although we 
could employ no tests of statistical inference on the effect of abolishing 
the RAP prior to the GST tax (we had only two years of qualifying 
 
 56 In 1986, Delaware reconfigured the Rule as applied to interests in trust into a 110-year 
limit on trust duration.  Act of July 3, 1986, ch. 422, 65 Del. Laws 831 (1986).  Prior to 1986 
Delaware enacted legislation providing that a new perpetuities period would begin on the exercise 
of a power of appointment, which remains good law in Delaware today.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
25, § 501 (1989).  Hence Delaware made possible a perpetual trust long before 1995.  However, 
Congress effectively foreclosed this option with I.R.C. § 2041(a)(3), which makes the extension 
of the perpetuities period under section 501 a taxable event for all trusts created in or after 1942.  
See I.R.C. § 2041(a)(3) (2000); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 15, at 694-95; Jonathan G. 
Blattmachr & Jeffrey N. Pennell, Adventures in Generation-Skipping, or How We Learned To Love 
the “Delaware Tax Trap,” 24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 75 (1989). 
 57 See 70 Del. Laws 164 (1995). 
 58 Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 13, at 1315-16 (quoting Letter from Jonathan G. 
Blattmachr to Jesse Dukeminier (July 9, 2002)). 
 59 See, e.g., Charles F. Gibbs & Colleen F. Carew, Trusts Leaving New York, Situs in 
Cyberspace: Time for Legislation?, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 20, 2002, at 3 (“Our New York state trust 
banker friends have been proclaiming for some years now a substantial loss of trust business to 
Delaware, South Dakota, and other more-hospitable venues . . . .”); Charles F. Gibbs & Marilyn 
Ordover, An Open Letter to Assemblywoman Ann Carrozza, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 5, 2001, at 3 (arguing 
that “to remain competitive with the other states,” New York must repeal the RAP); Thomas 
Scheffey, Is Immortality Just Around The Corner? “Dead Hand” Trust Law Relaxes Its Grip, 
CONN. L. TRIB., Mar. 4, 2002, at 10 (noting that the Connecticut legislature was considering a 
revision of the Rule “[i]n an effort to keep legal and banking work for ultra-rich clients from 
migrating to states with friendlier trust laws”). 
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data), we tentatively concluded that, “without the GST tax incentive to 
act as a wedge, few individuals would establish perpetual trusts.”60  
 
B.     The Alternate View: Perpetual Control 
 
In spite of the intuitive appeal of the foregoing evidence, there are 
good reasons to suppose that perpetual trusts had (and continue to have) 
appeal independent of the influence of the GST tax.  First, the 
legislative record of South Dakota’s 1983 repeal, although scanty, 
implies that the purpose of repeal was to attract trust business to the 
state61—and South Dakota’s repeal occurred three years prior to the 
enactment of the GST tax.  Hence it appears that, prior to the GST tax, 
lawyers and bankers in South Dakota concluded that offering perpetual 
trusts would attract trust business to the state. 
Second, in a recent study of donor preferences, Joshua Tate 
examined the online promotion of perpetual trusts.  Tate concluded that 
“while tax concerns are very important,” perpetual trust settlors also 
“want to make sure that their money is put to good use” and is protected 
“from beneficiaries’ bad judgment or misfortune.”62  Tate explained: 
While most settlors certainly want to pass tax savings down to their 
descendants, that is not the only apparent goal: settlors also wish to 
protect their wealth from being wasted and to encourage their 
descendants to be productive members of society.  Moreover, 
although it may be true that most settlors do not care about their 
unborn descendants, some of them might, and those who do probably 
 
 60 Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 1, at 398-99. 
 61 South Dakota’s Legislative Research Council (LRC) maintains the legislative history for 
bills introduced prior to 1997.  See How to Compile Legislative History Using the Legislative 
Research Council Website, http://legis.state.sd.us/general/leghist.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2006).  
In response to a request by the law library of Northwestern University for copies of the records 
pertaining to South Dakota’s repeal of the RAP, the LRC sent the following: (1) a one-page 
chronology of the steps leading up to the bill’s passage copied from the 1983 House Bills Index; 
(2) the bill’s language; and (3) the voting records of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees 
copied from the House and Senate Journals.  None of these materials contains a reference to the 
reason for repealing the RAP.  However, a voting record sheet of the House Judiciary Committee 
indicates that Tom Shelby, a Vice President at the Sioux Falls branch of the First Bank of South 
Dakota, and Dick Bogue, an attorney from Canton, testified in favor of repeal on February 23, 
1983.  Hearing Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 58th Leg. (S.D. Feb. 2, 1983) (statements of Tom 
Shelby and Dick Bogue) (on file with authors).  Further, according to Stewart Sterk, South 
Dakota’s repeal of the RAP was part of a larger set of tax and interest rate policy reforms 
designed to attract trust and banking business.  See Sterk, supra note 4, at 2101-02; see also 
Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.  
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=789704 (follow “Social Science Research 
Network” link to download). 
 62 Tate, supra note 16, at 613, 617. 
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want their spendthrift provisions and restrictions on the use of funds 
to continue indefinitely.63 
Accordingly, Tate concluded that “some settlors may have truly 
dynastic intentions.”64 
Third, history is replete with efforts by one generation to control 
subsequent generations’ disposition of the family patrimony.65  On this 
view, the perpetual trust might be reckoned the modern counterpart to 
the fee tail and strict settlement.66  Indeed, consistent with this idea and 
Tate’s findings, in our prior study we noted that “trust lawyers have told 
us anecdotes about settlors who” employ perpetual trusts “because they 
seek . . . perpetual control,” not merely tax advantages.67 
C.     A Look Abroad: Scotland 
 
 
 63 Id. at 620. 
 64 Id. at 619.  As Tate candidly acknowledges, however, his findings depend on the reliability 
of advertisements by practitioners as a proxy for settlor’s preferences and are also biased by 
selecting for practitioners who maintain promotional websites.  See id. at 612-13 & n.104.  
Further, Tate’s evidence is amenable to an alternative interpretation, namely, that lawyers find it 
necessary to highlight the non-tax benefits of perpetual trusts to assuage the settlor’s natural 
antipathy to them.  Cf. Moritz, supra note 1, at 2606 n.81 (reporting an interview with a South 
Dakota trust company officer in which the author was told that “[o]nce clients hear the full 
explanation, including non-tax reasons, they often become much more interested in” perpetual 
dynasty trusts). 
 65 Perhaps the most notorious is that of Peter Thellusson, who died in 1797.  See Leach, 
Terror, supra note 29, at 726 (stating that the “family-dynasty mentality flourished in the 
eighteenth century and reached a fine fruition in the will of Peter Thellusson”).  Thellusson’s will 
provided that the bulk of his considerable estate, plus all the income it would earn during the lives of 
the nine male descendants who survived him, should be accumulated for the ultimate benefit of his 
oldest male descendant at the end of that period.  See PATRICK POLDEN, PETER THELLUSSON’S 
WILL OF 1797 AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ON CHANCERY LAW (2002); Robert H. Sitkoff, The 
Lurking Rule Against Accumulations of Income, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 501 (2006); see also 
Fellows, supra note 8, at 2517 (discussing other examples). 
 66 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 67 Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 1, at 414; see also Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 661 
n.208.  Such efforts occasionally wind up in the case reports.  For example, in the amusing case 
of Marsh v. Frost National Bank, 129 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App. 2004), the court held invalid a 
bequest “to provide a million dollar trust fund for every American [eighteen] years or older” by 
accumulating income for 346 years on the proceeds from the sale of certain property because this 
purpose was not charitable and hence violated the Rule Against Perpetuities.  Id. at 176.  The 
testator had wanted the trust “to be called the James Madison Fund to honor our fourth President, 
the Father of the Constitution” and for the President, Vice President, and the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives to be the “permanent Trustees of the Fund.”  Id.  Another recent 
example, with a different result on the perpetuities question, is White v. Fleet Bank of Maine, 739 
A.2d 373 (Me. 1999).  In White, the testator left a holographic will providing for a trust from 
which three-fourths of the income would be paid to the testator’s lineal descendants and the other 
one-fourth would be “reinvested annually for the increase of funds in the [t]rust.”  Id. at 375.  The 
court held that the quoted language was a saving clause such that, under the then-applicable 
Maine wait-and-see statute, the bequest did not offend the Rule Against Perpetuities.  See id. at 
377.  The court nonetheless held the bequest invalid for violating the rule against accumulations 
of income.  See id. at 380; see also Sitkoff, supra note 65, at 511-12 (discussing White). 
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There is no Rule Against Perpetuities in Scotland, and “Scots law 
has never set its face against perpetuities in the same way as has 
happened in England and Wales.”68  Hence, trust practice in Scotland 
may offer another window on whether donors desire perpetual control 
independent of U.S. federal transfer-tax incentives.69 
The English Law Commission recently surveyed “the views of a 
number of Scottish conveyancing lawyers,”70 publishing its findings in a 
1998 report on perpetuities reform in England: 
What we discovered from our enquiries is that although perpetual 
trusts are created, they tend to be confined to public purposes, some 
of which are charitable and some of which are not.  We were given a 
tiny handful of examples of perpetual private trusts, including one 
created in the [eighteenth] century which eventually became 
impossible to administer because of uncertainty as to the identity of 
the beneficiaries.  In practice, the maximum duration of trusts in 
Scotland was, we were informed, about [one hundred] years.  Most 
were of much shorter duration, and there was little pressure from 
clients to create long-term trusts. 
   The conclusions that we have drawn from our study of Scottish 
law and practice are as follows.  The mere fact that the law allows 
the creation of perpetual trusts does not lead settlors to create them.  
In Scotland few do.  Other factors, such as taxation, or the risk of the 
disposition eventually failing for uncertainty, tend to encourage 
trusts to be set up for a comparatively short duration.71 
To be sure, the Law Commission’s survey of Scotland’s 
experience is limited.  Moreover, inferences about domestic perpetual 
trust practice drawn from experience in the English Commonwealth are 
inherently suspect because the English law of trust modification and 
termination is more liberal than the American law.72  Nonetheless, the 
Law Commission’s findings are consistent with the prevailing (but not 
exclusive) view among domestic scholars that tax incentives, not desires 
 
 68 ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, supra note 22, at 21; see also SIMPSON, supra note 23, at 
160-62 (comparing Scots and English law). 
 69 Still another possible source of information on desire for perpetual control independent of 
domestic transfer-tax advantages comes from the Canadian province of Manitoba, which 
abolished its Rule Against Perpetuities in 1983.  See Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, R.S.M., 
chs. 38, 43 (1983) (Manitoba, Can.); see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 15, at 721 
(discussing Manitoba); Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 13, at 1340-41.  We are not aware of any 
study comparing Manitoba with the rest of Canada. 
 70 See ENGLISH LAW COMMISSON, supra note 22, at 20.  Although the Law Commission 
“considered the possibility of commissioning a full study of the economic implications of 
abolishing the rule,” in the end it did not “because it proved impossible to obtain sufficient data.”  
Id. 
 71 Id. at 22; see also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 2, at 338 (stating that “perpetual 
settlements are rarely, if ever, created” in Scotland, but citing no authority for this proposition). 
 72 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 15, at 572-73 (comparing English and American law); 
Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 658-63 (same). 
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for dynastic control, sparked the recent domestic movement to promote 
perpetual trusts. 
 
III.     EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
A.     The Data 
 
As in our prior study, the trust data (state-level panel data) come 
from annual reports collected by the four federal agencies charged with 
banking regulation: (1) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC); (2) the Federal Reserve System; (3) the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (which superseded the Federal Home Loan Bank Board); 
and (4) the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.  Federal law 
requires all banks and other financial institutions that are regulated by 
these agencies to file an annual report detailing their trust holdings, 
including total assets and number of accounts.73  Based on this data, 
from 1969 until 2001 the Federal Financial Institutions Research 
Council published annual reports of trust holdings by regulated entities, 
summarizing the results by state.74  Since 2001, the FDIC has published 
these reports (now available online) organized by individual institution 
and by state.75  Our previous study includes an exhaustive treatment of 
the nature of and potential problems with the data.76 
The trust holdings of regulated entities are reported in categories 
entitled “Employee Benefit,” “Personal Trusts,” and “Estates.”  We 
examine here only “Personal Trusts,” a category that includes both 
private and charitable trusts (both testamentary and inter vivos), but 
excludes commercial trusts and employee benefit plans.  Prior to 1985, 
federal authorities only collected information on actively managed 
personal trusts (meaning trusts for which the regulated entity had 
discretionary investment authority), and neither savings-and-loan 
institutions nor savings banks with trust powers were required to 
report.77  Because the data are not consistent from 1969 through 2003, 
 
 73 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (2000) (FDIC); id. §§ 248(a), 1844(a) (Federal Reserve System); id. § 
1464 (Office of Thrift Supervision); id. §§ 1725, 1730 (Federal Home Loan Bank Board) 
(repealed 1989); id. §§ 161, 1817 (Office of Comptroller of the Currency). 
 74 FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, TRUST ASSETS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
(published annually from 1969 through 2000).  
 75 An interactive website allows one to obtain new data, state by state at FDIC: Statistics on 
Depository Institutions, http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/main.asp (last visited Apr. 3, 2006).  Older 
reports, from 1996 through 2000, may be obtained at FFIEC: Trust Institutions Information, 
http://www2.fdic.gov/structur/trust/index.asp (last visited Apr. 3, 2006). 
 76 See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 1, at 389-90, 434-35. 
 77 See FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, TRUST ASSETS OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS-1987, at 2, for a discussion. 
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we split the sample into two time periods: 1969 through 1984, and 1985 
through 2003. 
Another potential problem with the data arises from the Riegle-
Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (Riegle-
Neal Act).78  Effective in 1997, the Riegle-Neal Act made it much easier 
for banks and bank holding companies to convert independently 
chartered banks in other states into branch offices of a single interstate 
bank.79  Interstate bank mergers or branch consolidations have the 
potential to bias our results because the data are collected by institution, 
not by state.  For example, if a bank consolidated after 1997 by 
converting its independently chartered offices in state A into a branch of 
its headquarters bank chartered in state B, then trust assets formerly 
reported as held in state A would be reported as held by the headquarters 
bank in state B.  Mergers could have the same effect.  If a bank 
chartered in state A acquired a bank chartered in state B and then 
converted the acquired bank into a branch, the accounts formerly 
reported as held in state B would from that point forward be reported as 
held in state A. 
Although important to consider, bank mergers and consolidations 
do not pose a serious impediment to the current study for three reasons.  
First, in the present study we focus primarily on the data from 1969 
through 1984, well before the Riegle-Neal Act.  Second, to the extent 
we examine the data from 1985 through 2003, only substantial mergers 
between banks in RAP and abolition states have the potential to bias our 
results.  But as we noted in our prior perpetuities study, few such 
mergers have occurred.80  Instead, almost every substantial merger since 
the Riegle-Neal Act has involved only banks located in abolition states, 
which merely shifts funds from one control state to another.  Third, 
when using the data from 1985 through 2003 we examine not only total 
trust assets but also average trust account size, which should be less 
susceptible to bias from mergers than total trust assets.81 
 
 78 Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000)); see 
Patrick Mulloy & Cynthia Lasker, The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency 
Act of 1994: Responding to Global Competition, 21 J. LEGIS. 255, 270-72 (1995). 
 79 Prior to 1997, banks could maintain interstate branches under narrow circumstances, but a 
study conducted by the Federal Reserve found that few banks did so.  See Susan McLaughlin, The 
Impact of Interstate Banking and Branching Reform: Evidence from the States, CURRENT ISSUES 
IN ECON. & FIN., May 1995, at 1. 
 80 Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 1, at 389-90. 
 81 Average account size is computed by dividing the total reported assets by the number of 
reported accounts.  A swing up or down in reported assets caused by a merger also causes a 
corresponding swing up or down in the number of accounts reported in that state.  Thus, average 
account size should be less sensitive to distortion from mergers or branching than total assets.  
See id. at 390. 
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B.     Identification Strategies 
 
To assess the popularity of perpetual trusts prior to the GST tax, 
ideally we would examine the change in a state’s trust assets after it 
abolished the Rule relative to states that did not abolish the Rule.  
However, prior to the 1986 enactment of the GST tax, only three states 
had abolished the Rule: Wisconsin, Idaho, and South Dakota.  
Moreover, Wisconsin and Idaho abolished their Rules prior to the start 
of our data,82 so we are unable to make before-and-after comparisons 
for those states.  South Dakota abolished the Rule in 1983, only a few 
years before the enactment of the GST tax in 1986 and the change in 
data collection methods in 1985.  The data are thus insufficient to 
accommodate a before-and-after identification strategy such as 
differences-in-differences. 
Because we cannot undertake a before-and-after comparison, we 
instead examine existing differences across states.  Although not ideal, 
such comparisons, especially when made with similar states, are highly 
suggestive.  In the period under study, there was little variation in the 
basic law of trusts across the states,83 except that Idaho and Wisconsin 
previously permitted perpetual trusts and South Dakota did so beginning 
in 1983.  Further, the law of trusts consists largely of default rules that 
may be varied by the settlor.84  Accordingly, apart from state 
perpetuities law, in the typical case there would have been little reason 
to settle a trust out of state given the increased transaction costs of doing 
so. 
If the movement to abolish the RAP was driven by donors who 
desired control across generations rather than to exploit the perpetuities 
loophole in the GST tax, then the states that permitted perpetual trusts 
prior to the enactment of the GST tax ought to have had more trust 
 
 82 Indeed, Wisconsin may never have had the Rule.  See supra note 32. 
 83 State courts regularly cite the same leading authorities: the 1959 Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts and the current versions of the Scott and Bogert treatises.  Cf. John H. Langbein, The 
Uniform Trust Code: Codification of the Law of Trusts in the United States, 15 TR. L. INT’L 66, 
67 & n.3 (2001), available at http://www.astrea.com.ar/files/prologs/doctrina0157.pdf (noting the 
pervasive influence of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, “which has long been the most 
authoritative source for American trust law”).  In recent years the states’ trust laws have become 
increasingly differentiated on the issue of creditor’s rights in self-settled asset protection trusts, 
but these changes occurred after the period under study here.  See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra 
note 1, at 380-85.  Other important differences across states involve their fiduciary income, estate, 
and inheritance taxes.  See id. at 378-80 & n.71, 385-87.  In our prior study, however, we found 
that these considerations, by themselves, did not have a significant effect on the state’s reported 
trust funds.  See id. at 410-12 (income taxes), 385-87 & n.71 (estate and inheritance taxes). 
 84 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 4 cmt. a(1) (2003); John H. Langbein, Mandatory 
Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105 (2004); Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 642-43. 
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assets, ceteris paribus, than other states.  Further, because Idaho, 
Wisconsin, and South Dakota are relatively small states that at the time 
were not major banking centers, there is little other reason for them to 
have had a disproportionate share of the reported trust assets; if these 
states’ abolition of the RAP attracted significant trust assets, it should 
be obvious.  On the other hand, if the movement to abolish the RAP was 
sparked by the GST tax, then we would expect to observe differences 
between RAP states and abolition states only after 1986. 
Using the post-1985 data, in our prior study we examined the 
effect of abolishing the RAP on a state’s reported trust business, finding 
that from the enactment of the 1986 GST tax through 2003 a state’s 
abolition of the Rule increased its reported trust assets by about $6 
billion and its average trust account size by roughly $200,000.85  These 
findings imply that, from around the time the GST tax took effect 
through 2003, roughly $100 billion in trust assets poured into the 
abolishing states.86  Thus, in our prior study we concluded that 
transferors who desire a perpetual trust but live in a state that has 
retained the Rule have had little difficulty in creating an out-of-state 
perpetual trust. 
We also examined the effect of state income taxation of trust funds 
attracted from out of state,87 finding that, by itself, whether a state 
levied an income tax on trust funds attracted from out of state had little 
observable effect on a state’s reported trust business.  However, in tests 
of the interactive effect of such taxes with the abolition of the Rule, we 
found that states that abolished the RAP but levied such a tax 
experienced no observable increase in reported trust assets.88  In other 
words, abolishing the RAP attracted trust funds, but only if those funds 
would not be subject to a state fiduciary income tax. 
In view of the tax findings in our prior study, it is important to note 
that South Dakota does not levy an income tax on trust funds attracted 
from out of state, but Idaho does and Wisconsin did until 1999.89  
Inasmuch as our identification strategies in the present study depend 
primarily on observations from Idaho and Wisconsin, we must 
acknowledge the possibility that the income tax in those states 
 
 85 See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 1, at 410-11. 
 86 The $100 billion figure is only a point estimate.  For discussion of this estimate and its 
confidence interval, see id. at 404 & n.125. 
 87 We classify any state that “might levy a fiduciary income tax on the basis of an in-state 
trustee, in-state trust administration, or an in-state situs, even if the trust was settled by a 
nonresident for the benefit of nonresident beneficiaries and the trust consists entirely of intangible 
personal property,” as one that taxes trust funds attracted from out of state.  Id. at 430 n.176; see 
also id. at 385-87.   
 88 See id. at 410-11. 
 89 Put more precisely, in 1999 Wisconsin excluded trusts settled by nonresidents from its 
fiduciary income tax.  See WIS. STAT. § 71.14(3m) (2004). 
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confounds our perpetuities analysis.  Specifically, a finding that those 
states did not have a disproportionate share of trust business after 
abolishing the RAP could owe not to a lack of demand for perpetual 
trusts but alternatively to donors’ aversion to the income tax.  On the 
other hand, we may rely in part on our finding that South Dakota did not 
experience an increase in trust business between its 1983 abolition of 
the RAP and the 1986 enactment of the GST tax.  Indeed, South Dakota 
did not attract significant business until the 1990s, when the tax benefits 
of perpetual trusts became widely known and Delaware repealed its 
Rule. 
To assess whether abolishing the RAP had an effect on a state’s 
trust business prior to 1985, we undertake both graphical and regression 
analysis.  We begin by making simple graphical comparisons between 
Idaho, Wisconsin, South Dakota and similar neighboring states.90  To 
adjust for inflation, all of the graphs report values in constant dollars as 
of 2000.  We also normalize trust assets to account for differences in 
population and local economies across states by examining trust assets 
per person and average account size.  In the regression analysis, which 
allows us more formally to control for population, income, and year 
effects, we examine three variables: (1) trust assets per person, (2) 
average account size, and (3) total trust assets. 
 
C.     Graphical Analysis 
 
Figures 2 and 3 compare Idaho and Wisconsin respectively to 
some of their neighbors between 1969 and 1984, the same years 
included in the regression analysis.  We examine these years because 
they are prior to the GST tax (1986) and the changes in data collection 
(1985). 
 
 90 All states, not just those that are geographically proximate to abolishing states, are included 
in the regression analysis. 
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It does not appear that either Wisconsin or Idaho outperformed its 
neighbors over the sample period, which implies that Wisconsin’s and 
Figure 2: Trust Assets per Person in 
Idaho and Comparison States (1969-1984)
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Figure 3: Trust Assets per Person in 
Wisconsin and Comparison States (1969-1984)
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Idaho’s prior abolition of the Rule did not give them an advantage in the 
jurisdictional competition for trust funds. 
We now turn to South Dakota, which abolished the RAP in 1983.  
Here we include all years between 1969 and 2003, noting the 1985 
change in data collection methods and smoothing the data by examining 
average account size, which in our prior study we found to be quite 
responsive to the RAP’s abolition.91  Figure 4 compares South Dakota 
to North Dakota and Iowa. 
 
Prior to the early 1980s, average account sizes in South Dakota, 
Iowa, and North Dakota were quite similar, with Iowa faring a bit better 
over the 1970s.  South Dakota overtook both Iowa and North Dakota 
beginning in 1980, three years before South Dakota abolished the RAP 
in 1983.  There was no obvious increase in South Dakota’s average 
account size immediately after 1983.  There was also no immediate rise 
in assets after the 1986 enactment of the GST, but rather a gradual trend 
upward that accelerated in the mid-1990s, around the same time that 
Delaware entered the fray by abolishing its RAP (1995) and that the 
Governor of South Dakota formed a task force to assess South Dakota’s 
competitiveness in the market for trust business (1997).92  By contrast, 
average account size in Iowa and North Dakota remained virtually 
 
 91 See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 1, at 407-09. 
 92 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
Figure 4: Average Account Size in 
South Dakota and Comparison States (1969-2003)
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unchanged throughout the sample period.  (The changes in data 
collection methods introduced in 1985 apparently did not have much of 
an effect for these states.) 
Figure 5 compares South Dakota to Wisconsin and Idaho for the 
entire timeframe of the data so as to allow for a pre- and post-GST tax 
comparison.  Wisconsin and South Dakota clearly overtook Idaho by 
the early 1990s.  Further, South Dakota outpaced Wisconsin in the late 
1990s, after Delaware’s repeal of its RAP and the formation of the 
governor’s task force.  (Average trust account size in all three states 
appears to be sensitive to the stock market decline beginning in 2001.)93 
 
We posit that South Dakota broke away from Idaho and Wisconsin 
in the mid-1990s because South Dakota does not levy an income tax on 
trust funds attracted from out of state but Idaho does and Wisconsin did 
until it repealed the tax in 1999.  This hypothesis is strongly supported 
by the results of our prior study’s tests of the interactive effect of state 
 
 93 Sensitivity to stock prices is consistent with our findings in a separate empirical study of 
the effect of changes in trust investment law on trust portfolio allocation.  In that study we found 
that, starting in the late 1980s, the percentage of trust funds invested in stock steadily increased 
and the percentage invested in bonds and mortgages steadily decreased.  See Max M. 
Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent Trust Investment Laws Change Trust 
Portfolio Allocation? (New York Univ. Law and Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 05-30, 
2005; Northwestern Univ. Law and Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 05-27, 2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=868761 (follow “Social Science Research Network” link to 
download). 
Figure 5: Average Account Size in 
South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Idaho (1969-2003)
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tax and perpetuities laws.  Those results indicate that only the 
abolishing states that also did not tax trust funds attracted from out of 
state experienced an observable increase in reported trust assets.94  
Although it is too soon to assess whether Wisconsin’s 1999 repeal of its 
tax on trust funds attracted from out of state made it competitive with 
the other abolishing states, Figure 5 suggests visually that Wisconsin 
stopped losing ground to South Dakota after 1999. 
In our view, the foregoing graphs support the hypothesis that 
abolishing the RAP prior to the enactment of the GST tax had little 
effect on a state’s trust business.  The regression analysis reported 
below supports this interpretation of the graphs. 
Before turning to the regression analysis, however, we wish to 
make three further observations about Figures 4 and 5, which show that 
South Dakota experienced an increase in trust business after the GST 
tax, but not (visually) a substantial increase until the mid to late 1990s, 
after Delaware abolished its Rule.  First, we suspect that the delay may 
reflect the time necessary for the bar to digest the change in the tax law 
and to sell clients on the advantages of perpetual transfer-tax-exempt 
trusts.  The GST tax and the Rule Against Perpetuities are complex, and 
the interaction of the two was not immediately obvious.95 
Second, we suspect that Delaware’s repeal of its RAP may have 
validated the use of transfer-tax-exempt perpetual trusts.  Delaware is 
the leading state in corporate law and law firms elsewhere pay attention 
to developments in Delaware law.  Further, at around the same time, an 
increasing number of states began recognizing estate planner’s 
malpractice liability to intended beneficiaries.96  Inasmuch as many 
clients simply instruct that their estate plan should be designed to 
minimize all possible taxes, together these factors may have helped 
overcome lawyers’ resistance to settling trusts out of state.  In a related 
vein, the increased salience of the Rule after the GST tax may have 
 
 94 See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 1, at 410-11. 
 95 To put the learning difficulties into perspective, consider that USRAP was amended in 
1990—four years after its promulgation and the enactment of the GST tax, both in 1986—
because of a potential tax problem (irrelevant for this study) arising from the interaction of the 
two.  See UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1(e) (1990), 8B U.L.A. 236, 236-37 
(2001); Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities and the GST Tax: 
New Perils for Practitioners and New Opportunities, 30 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 185, 206-09 
(1995). 
 96 See Martin D. Begleiter, The Gambler Breaks Even: Legal Malpractice in Complicated 
Estate Planning Cases, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 277, 281-82 (2003); Sterk, supra note 4, at 2100-
01.  In a related vein, two South Dakota lawyers suggested in 1999 the possibility of a tort of 
“negligent trust situs.”  See Myers & Samp, supra note 40.  In 1979 Jesse Dukeminier presciently 
predicted that expanding malpractice liability would prompt lawyers to lobby for reform of 
technical rules.  See Jesse Dukeminier, Cleansing the Stables of Property: A River Found at Last, 
65 IOWA L. REV. 151 (1979). 
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overcome lawyers’ lack of awareness that perpetual trusts were even 
possible.97 
Third, because existing trusts in non-abolition states are drafted to 
comply with the Rule, and because moving a trust often requires 
judicial approval, the perpetual trust phenomenon may well be driven 
by new trusts rather than the movement of existing trusts.98  If so, the 
effect of abolition will be gradual as new trusts are created and 
accumulate. 
The foregoing observations about Figures 4 and 5 are consistent 
with the results of our prior study’s regression analysis, which strongly 
suggest an increasing effect of abolition over time, not an immediate 
result.99 
 
D.     Regression Analysis 
 
While the graphical analysis is suggestive, a proper comparison 
must also account for state- and time-specific factors that have the 
potential to affect trust asset levels.  To undertake such a comparison, 
we employ a more formal analysis using standard Ordinary Least 
Squares regressions.  In these regressions, we control for a variety of 
other factors that may explain differences between the states such as 
population, income, and variation over time stemming from the vagaries 
of financial markets and interest rates.  Further, we control for aggregate 
state income in the total trust assets regressions and, analogously, a 
state’s per capita income in regressions using trust assets per person or 
average account size.  We also include dummy variables for each state, 
excluding either Idaho or Wisconsin.  To avoid problems with data 
inconsistencies and the introduction of the GST tax, we examine only 
the years 1969 through 1984 (we examined 1985 through 2003 in our 
prior study).  Examining 1969 through 1984 gives us 797 state-year 
observations (data for Hawaii are missing for 1969-1971). 
Tables 1A and 1B report state differences in per capita assets; 
Tables 2A and 2B report state differences in average account size; and 
Tables 3A and 3B report state differences in aggregate assets.  The 
reported coefficients measure each state’s difference relative to the 
excluded state (either Idaho or Wisconsin) controlling for year, 
population, and income.  In other words, each coefficient measures how 
 
 97 See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 98 Cf. Sterk, supra note 4, at 2117 n.81. 
 99 The quadratic specifications, which we believe to be the proper functional form, indicate 
that trust funds grew at an increasing rate after a state abolished the RAP, peaking at about ten 
years after abolition.  See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 1, at 405. 
  
2494 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 27:6 
 
much worse (or better) the state performed in the jurisdictional 
competition for trust funds relative to the excluded state, controlling for 
population and income. 
If we observe that many states underperformed Idaho or 
Wisconsin, then we may infer that Idaho’s and Wisconsin’s repeal of 
the RAP gave those states an advantage in the jurisdictional competition 
for trust funds prior to the 1986 enactment of the GST tax.  Coefficients 
indicating that a state significantly underperformed Idaho or Wisconsin 
are reported in bold.  Coefficients indicating that a state significantly 
outperformed Idaho or Wisconsin are reported in italics.  Significance is 
indicated by the p-value.  Following convention, we use the standard 
5% level (p-value of .05 or less) as the threshold for significance.100 
Before discussing the results, we pause to explain the mechanics of 
interpreting the regression coefficients.  In Table 1A, for example, 
Alaska has a coefficient of -0.97 and a standard error of 0.42.101  This 
implies a p-value of 0.02, which means that, controlling for per capita 
income and year effects, there is only a 2% chance that Alaska is 
different from Idaho purely by chance.  The coefficient itself is 
interpreted as follows: Controlling for year effects and per capita 
income, Alaska had $970 less in trust assets per person than Idaho.  
Therefore, Alaska “underperformed” Idaho, meaning that Alaska did 
worse relative to Idaho than Alaska’s population and income would 
predict.  Because we cannot undertake a before-and-after approach, all 
states must be measured relative to an excluded state.  Hence, when we 
wish to compare states to Wisconsin, we run the same regression again, 
only we now exclude Wisconsin and include Idaho. 
 
1.     Trust Assets Per Capita (Tables 1A and 1B) 
 
In our regressions using trust assets per capita as the dependent 
variable, which are reported in Tables 1A and 1B, we find that Idaho 
outperformed only three states and underperformed sixteen.  In other 
words, Idaho was solidly in the lower-middle tier.  Wisconsin did 
slightly better, having outperformed twenty-three states and 
underperforming only six.  However, the states Wisconsin outperformed 
are concentrated in the South and Great Plains.  Wisconsin 
underperformed many states in the Northeast and outperformed none.  
Further, Wisconsin was little different from its neighbors, Illinois and 
Minnesota, though it did fare slightly better ($800 more per capita) than 
 
 100 Other common significance thresholds are 10% (indicated by a p-value of .1 or less) and 
1% (indicated by a p-value of .01 or less). 
 101 We report Huber-White standard errors, which are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. 
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Michigan.  Neither Idaho nor Wisconsin outperformed larger states such 
as Ohio, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New York.  On the contrary, 
Idaho and Wisconsin underperformed all four. 
Two other results in these Tables are noteworthy: (1) Delaware 
vastly outperformed its prediction based on its income and population, 
and (2) California underperformed its prediction based on its income 
and population.  The Delaware result confirms that Delaware was a 
strong player in the jurisdictional competition for trust funds prior to 
1985.  Indeed, we conjecture that the combination of Delaware’s 
longstanding friendliness toward trust funds attracted from out of state 
and its proximity to New York may explain the relatively weaker 
showing by New York. 
The California result is probably an artifact of California’s income 
being significantly higher than that in other states.  On average, 
California’s trust assets per person were comparable to Wisconsin’s, but 
controlling for income and population levels puts California’s numbers 
in a poor light.  These results are repeated in the regressions for average 
account size, reported in Tables 2A and 2B. 
 
2.     Average Account Size (Tables 2A and 2B) 
 
The results for trust assets per capita are largely replicated in our 
regressions taking average account size as the dependent variable, 
which are reported in Tables 2A and 2B.  Idaho is in the lower-middle 
tier, having outperformed seven states and underperforming fourteen.  
Wisconsin outperformed only three states and underperformed thirty. 
 
3.     Aggregate Trust Assets (Tables 3A and 3B) 
 
The results for aggregate trust assets, which are reported in Tables 
3A and 3B, tell a similar story.  On this metric Idaho was in the middle 
tier, having outperformed only four states and underperforming nine.  In 
addition, Idaho was not statistically different from its neighbors Utah 
and Montana.  Wisconsin outperformed seventeen states and 
underperformed eight states.  However, as in trust assets per capita, the 
states Wisconsin outperformed are concentrated in the South.  Further, 
Wisconsin substantially underperformed relative to its neighbor Illinois 
and is not statistically different than nearby Minnesota or Michigan. 
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E.     Summary of Empirical Findings 
 
We find no evidence that, in the years prior to the GST tax, states 
that abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities garnered more trust 
business relative to states that retained the Rule.  On the contrary, prior 
to the GST tax, the abolishing states had the same or lower trust assets 
than similar neighboring states, and were no match for leading trust 
jurisdictions that retained the Rule such as Delaware. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Twenty-one states have validated perpetual trusts by abolishing the 
Rule Against Perpetuities as applied to interests in trust.102  The 
prevailing view is that by conferring a salient tax advantage on long-
term trusts, the 1986 generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax sparked the 
movement to abolish the Rule.  However, an alternate view holds that 
demand for perpetual trusts stems from donors’ preference for control 
independent of tax considerations.  Proponents of both views have 
adduced supporting anecdotal evidence. 
This Article assessed the foregoing competing explanations for the 
rise of the perpetual trust by testing whether a state’s abolition of the 
Rule gave the state an advantage in the jurisdictional competition for 
trust funds.  As such, our approach has the virtue of looking at revealed 
preferences; we use direct evidence of what donors actually did as a 
proxy for what donors wanted.  Using state-level panel data on trust 
assets prior to the adoption of the GST tax, we find that, prior to the 
GST tax, a state’s abolition of the Rule did not increase the state’s trust 
business.  By contrast, in a prior study we found that between the time 
the GST tax took effect and 2003, roughly $100 billion in trust assets 
moved as a result of the Rule’s abolition.103  Accordingly, we conclude 
that the immediate stimulus for the modern perpetual trust phenomenon 
was the GST tax. 
To be sure, evidence of what donors did is an imperfect proxy for 
what donors wanted.  It is possible that donors desired perpetual trusts 
prior to the GST tax but few lawyers were aware that such trusts were 
possible.104  It is also possible that donors desired perpetual trusts but 
 
 102 See supra note 1.  
 103 Again, we caution that the $100 billion figure is only a point estimate.  For discussion of 
this estimate and its confidence interval, see Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 1, at 404 & 
n.125.   
 104 Cf. Friedman, supra note 18, at 550 & n.7.  In a related vein, several recent empirical 
studies have found that choice of lawyer has a significant effect on corporate transactional 
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could not overcome the transaction costs of settling a trust out of state in 
an era before cheap long distance calls, fax machines, and electronic 
mail.105  (Our results demonstrate, however, that Delaware was clearly 
attracting trust funds from out of state in the early 1970s, which 
undermines the transaction costs story.)  But at most these weaknesses 
in our proxy merely allow for alternative explanations for the empirical 
reality that, prior to the GST tax, states that abolished the Rule did not 
garner more trust business than those that retained the Rule.  Taken 
together, our findings in this and our prior study show that use of the 
perpetual trust traces to the 1986 GST tax and grew at an increasingly 
rapid pace thereafter. 
Our findings throw light on unresolved issues in federal tax and 
state property law.106  For example, without getting embroiled in the 
debate over the merits of taxing wealth transfers, on which there is 
already a thick academic literature,107 our findings lend support to 
recent proposals to decouple the duration of the GST tax exemption 
from state perpetuities law.108  Our findings suggest that the transfer 
 
structure.  See John C. Coates, IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the 
Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301 (2001); Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559 (2002); Guhan Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freeze-Outs: Theory, 
Evidence and Policy (Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law Sch. (PON), Research Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. 472, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=530284 (follow 
“Social Science Research Network” link to download). 
 105 This possibility is consistent with our prior study’s finding that not all trust assets that have 
moved into abolishing states since 1986 are exempt from federal transfer taxes.  See Sitkoff & 
Schanzenbach, supra note 1, at 396.  On the other hand, because there are efficiencies to locating 
all of one’s trust assets in a single trust account, see id. at 397, we cannot discern whether these 
non-exempt assets were moved because the donor sought to exploit those efficiencies versus a 
desire to exert perpetual control beyond the amount of the transfer tax exemption. 
 106 This discussion augments the fuller policy discussion of our prior study.  See id. at 412-20. 
 107 See, e.g., Wojciech Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, Tax Consequences on Wealth Accumulation 
and Transfers of the Rich, in DEATH AND DOLLARS: THE ROLE OF GIFTS AND BEQUESTS IN 
AMERICA 213 (Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Sundén eds., 2003); Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing 
Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1990); Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, A 
Consumption Tax on Gifts and Bequests?, 17 VA. TAX REV. 657 (1998); Joseph M. Dodge, 
Comparing a Reformed Estate Tax with an Accessions Tax and an Income-Inclusion System, and 
Abandoning the Generation-Skipping Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 551 (2003); Michael J. Graetz, To 
Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259 (1983); Edward J. McCaffery, The 
Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283 (1994); James R. Repetti, 
Democracy, Taxes and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825 (2001); Colloquium, Foreword: Wealth 
Transfer Taxation, 51 TAX L. REV. 357 (1996) (discussing McCaffery’s proposal to abolish the 
federal estate and gift tax); see also RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (William G. Gale 
et al. eds., 2001) (collecting eleven essays on the debate over estate taxation). 
 108 For example, in 2005 the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) proposed doing 
so by prohibiting the allocation of the transfer-tax exemption to a trust for the benefit of a 
generation more remote than the transferor’s grandchildren.  See JCT Report, supra note 17, at 
392-95.  The Task Force on Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes proposed several alternative means 
including imposition of a periodic tax on trusts and resetting the inclusion ratio after a period of 
years.  See Belcher & Fellows, supra note 43, at 268-74; see also John G. Shively, Note, The 
Death of the Life in Being—The Required Federal Response to State Abolition of the Rule Against 
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taxes are being avoided in a manner that Congress did not intend.109  
Our findings also suggest that the rise of the perpetual trust reflects 
avoidance behavior that would not occur without the tax stimulus, 
implying deadweight loss in the form of the attendant transaction costs. 
Moreover, our findings tend to support recent proposals to 
liberalize the law of trust modification and termination to allow a court 
to adapt a long-term trust to reflect what the settlor would have wanted 
had the settlor anticipated subsequent changes in circumstances.110  
Because the movement to abolish the Rule and the corresponding rise of 
the perpetual trust reflect strategies to minimize taxes, not a burgeoning 
desire among donors for perpetual control, such proposals are likely to 
facilitate rather than frustrate the settlor’s intent.111   
Finally, although the rise of the perpetual trust might appear to 
supply evidence of a dynastic impulse,112 our findings cast doubt on the 
validity of that inference.  Instead, our findings underscore the 
importance of tax considerations in driving the structure of donative 
transfers by tax-sensitive wealth holders. 
 
Perpetuities, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 394 (2000) (contending that the “best solution to the problems 
created by abolition of the Rule is to eliminate the generation-skipping exemption”).  As detailed in 
our prior study, however, some of the JCT Report’s empirical assumptions are erroneous.  See 
Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 1, at 419-20. 
 109 As Jeffrey Pennell has explained, Congress sought to prevent the “enjoyment of property 
followed by its movement down the generations without being subjected to estate or gift tax.”  
JEFFREY N. PENNELL, WEALTH TRANSFER PLANNING AND DRAFTING ch. 18, at 27 (2005); see 
also JCT Report, supra note 15, at 394; H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 824-25 (1985); WILLBANKS, 
supra note 42, § 15.07. 
 110 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.  Another idea, which has been discussed in 
the context of cy pres of perpetual charitable trusts but could be extended to perpetual private 
trusts, is to allow more liberal modification and termination after the perpetuities period expires—
that is, to allow freer modification and termination after the death of everyone known to the 
settlor and the minority of the next generation.  See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Limiting Dead Hand 
Control of Charitable Trusts: Expanding the Use of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 
353, 355-56 (1999); cf. French, supra note 14, at 2534-35. 
 111 Allowing courts to adapt perpetual trusts to account for changed circumstances would also 
align the default rule with the flexibility provided for in professionally-drafted perpetual transfer-
tax-exempt trust forms.  Such forms typically give each generation a special power to appoint the 
property to the next generation either outright or in further trust.  See, e.g., Nenno, supra note 54, 
at 164 (supplying a model clause); see also Pierce H. McDowell, III, The Dynasty Trust: 
Protective Armor for Generations to Come, TR. & EST., Oct. 1993, at 47, 53 (noting that it “is 
often desirable to give at least some of the beneficiaries special testamentary powers of 
appointment that will enable them to change the dispositive terms of the trust” in light of 
unanticipated changes in circumstances).  With such a power each generation can decide whether to 
continue the trust (and its tax exemption) or to bring the trust to an end.  For further discussion, see 
Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 1, at 413-14.  See also PENNELL, supra note 109, at ch. 4, pp. 
2-6 (discussing flexibility and dead hand control). 
 112 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.   
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TABLE 1A: 
TRUST ASSETS PER CAPITA 1969-1984 
ALL STATES RELATIVE TO IDAHO 
 Coefficient 
(in Thousands) 
Robust 
Standard Error 
p-value 
 
Alabama 0.08 0.18 0.67 
Alaska -0.97 0.42 0.02 
Arizona 0.39 0.16 0.01 
Arkansas -0.19 0.15 0.19 
California -2.49 1.22 0.04 
Colorado 0.45 0.22 0.04 
Connecticut 2.38 0.36 0.00 
Delaware 16.44 1.38 0.00 
Florida -0.32 0.47 0.50 
Georgia 0.02 0.25 0.93 
Hawaii 0.45 0.44 0.31 
Illinois 0.97 0.66 0.14 
Indiana 0.24 0.29 0.41 
Iowa 0.06 0.21 0.79 
Kansas 0.03 0.20 0.90 
Kentucky 0.43 0.17 0.01 
Louisiana -0.66 0.19 0.00 
Maine 0.73 0.11 0.00 
Maryland 0.16 0.33 0.63 
Massachusetts 1.58 0.37 0.00 
Michigan -0.28 0.50 0.58 
Minnesota 0.52 0.27 0.05 
Mississippi -0.23 0.16 0.16 
Missouri 1.09 0.30 0.00 
Montana 0.05 0.13 0.72 
Nebraska 0.62 0.16 0.00 
Nevada 0.73 0.23 0.00 
New Hampshire 0.22 0.14 0.12 
New Jersey -0.37 0.49 0.45 
New Mexico 0.11 0.12 0.35 
New York 0.55 1.00 0.59 
North Carolina -0.11 0.26 0.68 
North Dakota 0.07 0.15 0.66 
Ohio 0.55 0.57 0.34 
Oklahoma 0.22 0.17 0.20 
Oregon 0.00 0.18 0.98 
Pennsylvania 1.28 0.63 0.04 
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 Coefficient 
(in Thousands) 
Robust 
Standard Error 
p-value 
 
Rhode Island 2.79 0.16 0.00 
South Carolina -0.19 0.15 0.21 
South Dakota 0.15 0.18 0.41 
Tennessee 0.15 0.20 0.44 
Texas -0.99 0.68 0.15 
Utah 0.43 0.13 0.00 
Vermont 0.52 0.14 0.00 
Virginia -0.29 0.29 0.33 
Washington 0.13 0.26 0.63 
West Virginia 0.58 0.15 0.00 
Wisconsin 0.52 0.27 0.06 
Wyoming 0.06 0.18 0.74 
N=797. Three states have statistically significant lower trust assets 
per person; sixteen have significantly greater trust assets per capita.  
Dollar values adjusted for inflation (Year 2000=100).  Year dummies 
and controls for state population and per capita income are not reported. 
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TABLE 1B: 
TRUST ASSETS PER CAPITA 1969-1984 
ALL STATES RELATIVE TO WISCONSIN 
 Coefficient 
(in Thousands) 
Robust 
Standard Error 
p-value 
Alabama -0.45 0.20 0.02 
Alaska -1.49 0.30 0.00 
Arizona -0.13 0.16 0.41 
Arkansas -0.71 0.26 0.01 
California -3.01 0.97 0.00 
Colorado -0.07 0.12 0.56 
Connecticut 1.86 0.20 0.00 
Delaware 15.92 1.47 0.00 
Florida -0.84 0.23 0.00 
Georgia -0.50 0.11 0.00 
Hawaii -0.07 0.42 0.87 
Idaho -0.52 0.27 0.06 
Illinois 0.45 0.41 0.28 
Indiana -0.29 0.08 0.00 
Iowa -0.47 0.15 0.00 
Kansas -0.50 0.16 0.00 
Kentucky -0.09 0.18 0.60 
Louisiana -1.19 0.15 0.00 
Maine 0.21 0.26 0.42 
Maryland -0.36 0.14 0.01 
Massachusetts 1.06 0.14 0.00 
Michigan -0.80 0.26 0.00 
Minnesota 0.00 0.11 0.98 
Mississippi -0.75 0.29 0.01 
Missouri 0.57 0.16 0.00 
Montana -0.48 0.25 0.06 
Nebraska 0.10 0.20 0.62 
Nevada 0.20 0.20 0.31 
New Hampshire -0.30 0.22 0.16 
New Jersey -0.90 0.24 0.00 
New Mexico -0.41 0.26 0.12 
New York 0.02 0.76 0.98 
North Carolina -0.63 0.12 0.00 
North Dakota -0.45 0.26 0.08 
Ohio 0.03 0.33 0.94 
Oklahoma -0.30 0.15 0.05 
Oregon -0.52 0.13 0.00 
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 Coefficient 
(in Thousands) 
Robust 
Standard Error 
p-value 
Pennsylvania 0.76 0.39 0.05 
Rhode Island 2.27 0.22 0.00 
South Carolina -0.71 0.22 0.00 
South Dakota -0.38 0.30 0.20 
Tennessee -0.37 0.14 0.01 
Texas -1.51 0.44 0.00 
Utah -0.09 0.25 0.73 
Vermont -0.01 0.29 0.98 
Virginia -0.81 0.08 0.00 
Washington -0.40 0.08 0.00 
West Virginia 0.06 0.26 0.83 
Wyoming -0.46 0.21 0.03 
N=797. Twenty-three states have statistically significant lower 
trust assets per person; six have significantly greater trust assets per 
capita.  Dollar values adjusted for inflation (Year 2000=100).  Year 
dummies and controls for state population and per capita income are not 
reported. 
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TABLE 2A: 
AVERAGE ACCOUNT SIZE 1965-1984 
ALL STATES RELATIVE TO IDAHO 
 Coefficient 
(in Thousands) 
Robust 
Standard Error 
p-value 
Alabama 157 24 0.16 
Alaska -34 76 0.65 
Arizona 90 38 0.02 
Arkansas -32 37 0.40 
California -446 151 0.00 
Colorado 27 41 0.51 
Connecticut 118 56 0.03 
Delaware 1,190 107 0.00 
Florida -98 66 0.14 
Georgia 107 48 0.03 
Hawaii 373 135 0.01 
Illinois -72 85 0.40 
Indiana -111 47 0.02 
Iowa -96 40 0.02 
Kansas -1 40 0.99 
Kentucky 40 39 0.31 
Louisiana -154 42 0.00 
Maine -5 35 0.88 
Maryland 122 54 0.03 
Massachusetts 88 55 0.11 
Michigan -57 72 0.43 
Minnesota 169 45 0.00 
Mississippi -50 42 0.23 
Missouri 198 45 0.00 
Montana -49 42 0.25 
Nebraska 37 40 0.35 
Nevada 282 47 0.00 
New Hampshire 10 36 0.78 
New Jersey -14 68 0.84 
New Mexico 7 37 0.85 
New York 34 128 0.79 
North Carolina -7 47 0.88 
North Dakota -59 39 0.13 
Ohio -48 80 0.55 
Oklahoma 311 39 0.00 
Oregon 82 38 0.03 
Pennsylvania -283 84 0.00 
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 Coefficient 
(in Thousands) 
Robust 
Standard Error 
p-value 
Rhode Island 249 36 0.00 
South Carolina 5 41 0.91 
South Dakota -28 45 0.54 
Tennessee 83 43 0.05 
Texas -165 90 0.07 
Utah -15 42 0.73 
Vermont -70 39 0.07 
Virginia -91 47 0.05 
Washington 69 45 0.13 
West Virginia 108 38 0.00 
Wisconsin -101 45 0.03 
Wyoming 16 41 0.70 
N=797. Seven states have statistically significant lower average 
account size; fourteen have significantly greater average account size.  
Dollar values adjusted for inflation (Year 2000=100).  Year dummies 
and controls for state population and per capita income are not reported. 
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TABLE 2B: 
AVERAGE ACCOUNT SIZE 1965-1984 
ALL STATES RELATIVE TO WISCONSIN 
 Coefficient 
(in Thousands) 
Robust 
Standard Error 
p-value 
Alabama 57 40 0.16 
Alaska 66 63 0.30 
Arizona 190 21 0.00 
Arkansas 69 31 0.03 
California -346 119 0.00 
Colorado 128 18 0.00 
Connecticut 219 34 0.00 
Delaware 1,290 110 0.00 
Florida 3 31 0.93 
Georgia 207 23 0.00 
Hawaii 474 128 0.00 
Idaho 101 45 0.03 
Illinois 29 51 0.57 
Indiana -10 14 0.44 
Iowa 5 18 0.80 
Kansas 100 22 0.00 
Kentucky 141 22 0.00 
Louisiana -54 22 0.02 
Maine 95 32 0.00 
Maryland 223 30 0.00 
Massachusetts 189 23 0.00 
Michigan 44 40 0.28 
Minnesota 269 17 0.00 
Mississippi 50 38 0.19 
Missouri 298 13 0.00 
Montana 52 39 0.18 
Nebraska 138 29 0.00 
Nevada 383 35 0.00 
New Hampshire 111 27 0.00 
New Jersey 87 36 0.02 
New Mexico 108 34 0.00 
New York 135 98 0.17 
North Carolina 94 20 0.00 
North Dakota 42 35 0.24 
Ohio 52 49 0.28 
Oklahoma 412 22 0.00 
Oregon 182 18 0.00 
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 Coefficient 
(in Thousands) 
Robust 
Standard Error 
p-value 
Pennsylvania -182 52 0.00 
Rhode Island 350 27 0.00 
South Carolina 105 30 0.00 
South Dakota 73 43 0.09 
Tennessee 184 23 0.00 
Texas -64 57 0.27 
Utah 86 38 0.02 
Vermont 31 38 0.42 
Virginia 10 11 0.39 
Washington 169 15 0.00 
West Virginia 209 32 0.00 
Wyoming 116 33 0.00 
N=797. Three states have statistically significant lower average 
account size; thirty have significantly greater average account size.  
Dollar values adjusted for inflation (Year 2000=100).  Year dummies 
and controls for state population and per capita income are not reported. 
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TABLE 3A: 
TOTAL ASSETS 1965-1984 
ALL STATES RELATIVE TO IDAHO 
 
Coefficient 
(in billions) 
Robust 
Standard Error 
p-value 
Alabama -1.56 1.31 0.24 
Alaska -0.36 1.11 0.75 
Arizona -0.06 0.76 0.94 
Arkansas -1.53 0.71 0.03 
California -7.93 9.22 0.39 
Colorado 0.21 0.88 0.81 
Connecticut 6.74 1.17 0.00 
Delaware 9.68 0.71 0.00 
Florida -0.82 3.47 0.81 
Georgia -1.52 1.89 0.42 
Hawaii 0.52 0.74 0.49 
Illinois 18.57 4.69 0.00 
Indiana 0.15 1.97 0.94 
Iowa -0.95 0.99 0.34 
Kansas -0.82 0.78 0.30 
Kentucky -0.18 1.22 0.88 
Louisiana -4.39 1.41 0.00 
Maine 0.57 0.37 0.12 
Maryland -0.05 1.53 0.98 
Massachusetts 8.85 2.18 0.00 
Michigan 0.31 3.57 0.93 
Minnesota 0.98 1.45 0.50 
Mississippi -1.97 0.84 0.02 
Missouri 4.06 1.90 0.03 
Montana 0.10 0.40 0.80 
Nebraska 0.44 0.52 0.40 
Nevada 0.51 0.60 0.39 
New Hampshire 0.16 0.42 0.70 
New Jersey -1.04 2.85 0.72 
New Mexico -0.20 0.40 0.62 
New York 37.43 8.00 0.00 
North Carolina -2.25 2.08 0.28 
North Dakota 0.21 0.42 0.63 
Ohio 11.04 4.33 0.01 
Oklahoma -0.57 0.96 0.55 
Oregon -0.94 0.76 0.22 
Pennsylvania 22.53 4.88 0.00 
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Coefficient 
(in billions) 
Robust 
Standard Error 
p-value 
Rhode Island 2.56 0.37 0.00 
South Carolina -2.12 0.99 0.03 
South Dakota 0.25 0.42 0.55 
Tennessee -1.15 1.54 0.45 
Texas -3.07 5.35 0.57 
Utah 0.16 0.43 0.71 
Vermont 0.60 0.42 0.16 
Virginia -2.48 1.88 0.19 
Washington -0.57 1.33 0.67 
West Virginia 0.21 0.62 0.73 
Wisconsin 1.27 1.66 0.44 
Wyoming 0.31 0.55 0.57 
N=797. Four states have statistically significant lower trust assets; 
nine have significantly greater trust assets.  Dollar values adjusted for 
inflation (Year 2000=100).  Year dummies and controls for state 
population and total state income are not reported. 
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TABLE 3B: 
TOTAL ASSETS 1965-1984 
ALL STATES RELATIVE TO WISCONSIN 
 Coefficient 
(in billions) 
Robust 
Standard Error
p-value 
Alabama -2.83 0.62 0.00 
Alaska -1.63 2.07 0.43 
Arizona -1.33 1.00 0.19 
Arkansas -2.80 1.16 0.02 
California -9.20 7.63 0.23 
Colorado -1.06 0.89 0.23 
Connecticut 5.47 0.87 0.00 
Delaware 8.40 1.85 0.00 
Florida -2.09 1.88 0.27 
Georgia -2.79 0.46 0.00 
Hawaii -0.76 1.75 0.67 
Idaho -1.27 1.66 0.44 
Illinois 17.29 3.17 0.00 
Indiana -1.13 0.45 0.01 
Iowa -2.22 0.86 0.01 
Kansas -2.09 1.07 0.05 
Kentucky -1.46 0.66 0.03 
Louisiana -5.66 0.49 0.00 
Maine -0.70 1.56 0.66 
Maryland -1.32 0.54 0.02 
Massachusetts 7.57 0.76 0.00 
Michigan -0.96 1.97 0.63 
Minnesota -0.29 0.57 0.61 
Mississippi -3.24 1.09 0.00 
Missouri 2.79 0.81 0.00 
Montana -1.17 1.70 0.49 
Nebraska -0.83 1.38 0.54 
Nevada -0.76 1.76 0.67 
New Hampshire -1.11 1.65 0.50 
New Jersey -2.31 1.28 0.07 
New Mexico -1.47 1.51 0.33 
New York 36.16 6.55 0.00 
North Carolina -3.52 0.60 0.00 
North Dakota -1.07 1.75 0.54 
Ohio 9.77 2.77 0.00 
Oklahoma -1.84 0.84 0.03 
Oregon -2.21 1.00 0.03 
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 Coefficient 
(in billions) 
Robust 
Standard Error
p-value 
Pennsylvania 21.26 3.40 0.00 
Rhode Island 1.29 1.60 0.42 
South Carolina -3.39 0.84 0.00 
South Dakota -1.02 1.74 0.56 
Tennessee -2.43 0.41 0.00 
Texas -4.34 3.76 0.25 
Utah -1.11 1.47 0.45 
Vermont -0.67 1.81 0.71 
Virginia -3.75 0.39 0.00 
Washington -1.84 0.46 0.00 
West Virginia -1.06 1.27 0.40 
Wyoming -0.96 1.85 0.60 
N=797.  Seventeen states have statistically significant lower trust 
assets; eight have significantly greater trust assets.  Dollar values 
adjusted for inflation (Year 2000=100).  Year dummies and controls for 
state population and total state income are not reported. 
 
 
